Despite the long experience in the United States with restructuring firms in bankruptcy, there remains a persistent tendency for firms to emerge from bankruptcy with too much debt and negative profitability as compared to firms which successfully avoid future financial distress after emergence. We assess the future viability of firms just as they exit the bankruptcy reorganization process, specifically as to whether they will file again --the "Chapter 22" phenomenon. Using a variant of the Z-Score model, one can distinguish quite well the postbankruptcy performance of publicly owned industrial firms. We conclude that careful screening of firms that exit bankruptcy can improve on the effectiveness of the reorganization process.
The first requirement of a successful restructuring is for the firm to, in fact, emerge from the process as a going concern. A further test is to assess the post-bankruptcy results of the entity as to its operating and/or its stock market performance. While this performance may be compared to other firms in the same industry or to some stock market index over time, it is clear that if the firm is forced to seek another distressed restructuring within a relatively short period of time after emerging, the process was not a success at all. The most extreme instance of a failed Chapter 11 is that the firm files for bankruptcy again --a situation that has been described as "Chapter 22" (Hotchkiss, 1992 , Altman, 1993 . 2 Studies of post-bankruptcy performance, reviewed in Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) , find that while many firms restructure without the need of further remedial action, a striking number of cases require that the reorganized business needs to restructure again through a private workout or a second (or third!) bankruptcy. For example, Hotchkiss (1995) found that 32 percent of her sample of large companies that emerged as a public entity restructured again through a private or court determined restructuring, and LoPucki and Whitford (1993) , in their study of larger Chapter 11 filings, found that 32 percent filed again within four years of emerging. While some firms emerge still with too much debt, most firms cite operating problems as the primary reason for the second filing.
As we will show, the troubling incidence of subsequent failures has accrued despite requirements, under the Bankruptcy Codes enacted in 1978, and amended in 2005 (BAPCA) , that, in order for a reorganization plan to be confirmed, the bankruptcy court must make an independent finding that the plan is feasible and that further reorganization is not likely or 2 Edith Hotchkiss, working on her dissertation at New York University, compiled a list of "two-time filers" which she called Chapter 22's. Among the early two-time filers of Chapter 11 were Commonwealth Oil (1979 Oil ( , 1984 , Cook United (1984 United ( , 1987 , CS Group (1982 Group ( , 1984 , W & J Sloan (1981, 1988) and Continental Airlines (1983, 1999). needed; specifically that the plan "is not likely to be followed by the liquidation or the need for further financial reorganization of the debtor or any successors of the debtor under the plan (Section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code). In reality, however, unless there is convincing opposing evidence presented by interested parties, the bankruptcy court has little choice but to sanction the plan as presented.
A -Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is not to debate the merits of Chapter 11, especially since the Bankruptcy Code has recently been substantially modified in 2005 . The purpose is to analyze whether one could predict, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, which firms emerging from bankruptcy are more likely to suffer subsequent problems and file again under "Chapter 22." In other words, can advisors, analysts, investors, and the debtors, indeed, the court system itself, avoid as much as possible the Chapter 22 phenomenon.
B -Post Bankruptcy Performance
It is important to understand that a relatively high proportion of larger firms that attempt to reorganize under Chapter 11 do emerge as independent, going-concerns 3 . At the same time, Altman and Hotchkiss (2005) show that for public firms of all sizes only between 26-45% (depending upon the year) emerged over the period 1990-2002 with their reorganization plans confirmed by the courts, and these statistics include many firms with multiple filings for various subsidiaries of the same firm. For those firms which had their plans confirmed, about 44% emerged as a publicly registered company (see Hotchkiss and Mooradian's (2004) study of 1400
Chapter 11 case outcomes from . The most important determinant of a firm's likelihood of emerging successfully was the firm's size (measured by assets at the time of the bankruptcy petition --see Hotchkiss (1993) and more recently by its ability to secure debtor-inpossession (DIP) financing (Dahiya et al (2003) . Size and access to post-petition financing are, not surprisingly, highly correlated. Gilson (1997) found that leverage remained high after both out-of-court restructuring and
Chapter 11 reorganization, although it remained considerably more elevated after the out-ofcourt strategy. In a study of 58 out-of-court cases and 51 firms which went through the Chapter 11 process over the period 1980-1989, he found that the median ratio of long-term debt (face value) to the sum of long-term debt and common shareholders equity (market value) was 0.64 for firms that restructure out-of-court and 0.47 for those that reorganize in Chapter 11. Hence, significant remaining debt on the balance sheets of reorganized firms could contribute to their refiling in the not too distant period after emergence. He also found that as much 25 percent of his total sample had to file for bankruptcy (again in the case of emerged firms from Chapter 11) or restructure their debt again. Heron, Lie and Rogers (2006) find similar results to that of Gilson (above) in that while firms they studied substantially reduce their debt burden in "fresh start" Chapter 11 reorganizations, they still emerged with higher debt ratios than what is typical in their respective industries. They studied 172 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 under "fresh start" accounting values (firms which emerged with a significant change in equity ownership) from 1990 to 2004.
Existing studies that have examined the post-bankruptcy performance of firms registered as public companies can be found in Table I . Several of these studies assessed the performance of firms' profitability and cash flows relative to comparable firms in similar industries. The overwhelming result was that more than two-thirds of those emerged firms underperform industry peers for up to five years following bankruptcy and in some studies (e.g., Hotchkiss, 1995) as much as 40 percent continued to experience operating losses in the three years after emergence. McHugh, et al (1998) show that projections provided by the Bankruptcy reorganization plan for two-time filers (Chapter 22s) prior to their emergence from their first
Chapter 11 are typically overstated and these overstatements are more pronounced for two-time filers than for single filers.
On the other hand, however, recent experience for larger firms do show improved postbankruptcy experience and one study by Eberhart, Aggarwal and Altman (1999) shows significant excess stock market returns in the 200 days following emergence for those firms which emerged in the period 1980-1993 with publicly listed equity. While this positive stock price performance seems to be cyclical, with poorer performance in the mid-to-late 1990s, a number of more recent firms enjoyed spectacular post-bankruptcy returns after the surge in bankruptcies in 2001-2002. 4 Lee and Cunney (2004) found that investing in formerly bankrupt firms' equities between 1988-2003 (sample of 111 firms) resulted in a positive average 85% relative to the S&P 500 Index performance in the first 12 months after emergence. The volatility of these returns was extremely high, however, with only 50% of the stocks outperforming. annualized returns are not significantly different from returns on the S&P 500 stock index, i.e., they neither under nor over perform. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) find, from a sample of 288 firms that defaulted on public debt, most of whom went bankrupt, that while 32 percent experienced negative operating performance in the year following emergence if there were no outside "vulture" investors directly involved with significant ownership, only about 12 percent had the same negative experience when a "vulture" was actively involved in the restructuring.
-Subsequent Distressed Restructurings
As noted earlier, roughly one-third of those firms emerging as a publicly registered company experience some form of subsequent distressed restructuring again, including the filing years, is that many of the larger Chapter filings involve "prepackaged" agreements, which usually only attempt to "fix" the capital structure problems of the distressed company. Amongst these cases, more Chapter 22s might be expected.
-Avoiding Chapter 22
In order to assess the ability to predict the subsequent performance of firms emerging from Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, we utilize a bankruptcy prediction model known as the Z"-Score model, patterned after the classic Altman Z-Score model of 1968, (see Altman and Hotchkiss, (2005) for a description of the Z"-Score model and its application to industrial firms and emerging market entities). The Z"-Score model was first developed for testing the efficacy of credit scoring of emerging market firms (Altman, Hartzell and Peck, 1995) and then applied to US non-manufacturers as well as manufacturing industrials. The success of the emerging market application was further tested by Altman (2005) .
The logic behind this methodology is that if a model has proven to be credible and accepted by academics and practitioners for predicting corporate distress, 8 it might also be 8 The Altman Z-Score models are widely accepted and found in financial textbooks and scholarly articles, as well as on many financial software packages and information sources. For example, Bloomberg terminal results show that there are regularly close to 1,000 "hits" per day on the "Altman Z-Score" (AZS) page.
effective in assessing the future health of firms emerging from bankruptcy reorganization, especially if the result you are trying to predict (avoid) is a second filing of bankruptcy.
The original Z-Score model (Altman, 1968) was built primarily for manufacturing firms, although many use it for other industrial firms, as well. Firms need to be publicly held since one of the variables, the market value of equity/total liabilities (X 4 in Table IV ) requires the availability of publicly traded equity. In order to make the model more robust across all industrial groupings, as well as for privately owned companies, Altman developed the Z"-Score model, first for US companies and then adapted for emerging market firms ( Table V) . Note that the Z"-Score model has four variables, not five as in the original model. The Sales/Total Tangible Assets variable is removed and the coefficients re-estimated.
[ Tables IV and V Here] In order to make the Z"-Score model more meaningful, Altman developed the concept of a bond-rating-equivalent (BRE) of the Z"-Score (and for Z-Score, as well --see Altman & Hotchkiss, 2005) . Table VI shows the Z"-Score model and its BREs based on data from 1996; chosen as an appropriate year for our subsequent empirical tests. The equation used to calculate Z"-Score was modified by adding a constant term of 3.25 so as to scale the scores to a "D" rating equal to zero (0.0). 9 Firms with Z"-Scores above zero have BREs in the non-bankrupt zones (AAA to CCC-).
[ Table VI Here]
A -Expectations
We will now explore the results of applying the Z"-Score model to two samples of firms that emerged from bankruptcy. One sample consists of Chapter 22s or 33s, i.e., they filed a second or third time for bankruptcy. The second sample represents those Chapter 11 emergences which did not file a second time.
Since both samples represent firms that have undergone an extensive restructuring, usually of both their operations and capital structure, one might expect that their financial profiles upon emergence will resemble a going-concern, non-bankrupt entity. If, however, the bankruptcy prediction model is effective in detecting future problems, then we should find that the average Z"-Score values of the Chapter 22 sample will be significantly lower (worse) than the sample of Chapter 11s.
B -Sample Characteristics
We have assembled two samples of firms which have (1) filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 and have not suffered a subsequent distressed restructuring, including a second bankruptcy filing (Chapter 11s), and (2) have filed for bankruptcy protection at least twice (Chapter 22s). The effective confirmation date of the bankruptcy reorganization plans for the 45
Chapter 11s was between 1993 and 2003 ( Table VIIa) . The latter date was chosen so that there has been at least five years since the firm emerged from bankruptcy and has not filed again. The firms were chosen based mainly on data availability for calculating the Z"-Score distress prediction model. Our objective was to assemble a reasonably large representative sample of industrial firms that filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and emerged as publicly held firms with post-bankruptcy financial data available during roughly the same data period as our Chapter 
C -Post-Bankruptcy Distress Prediction Results
In order to test the effectiveness of screening Chapter 11 emerging firms for potential serious subsequent distress, we utilize the Z"-Score prediction model on our samples of Chapter 11 single versus multiple filers. A comparison of the average Z"-Scores and their respective bond rating equivalents (BREs) will be observed and statistical difference tests applied between the two groups. We observe from Table VII (a) that the average Z"-Score for our sample of single-filers (Chapter 11s), based on data from their first financial statement following emergence, was 4.73 (4.38 median), with a bond rating equivalent of B+ (see Table VI ). The B+ BRE is consistent with our observations over time that almost all firms that do emerge with bonds outstanding have a bond rating usually in the single-B to double-B range, rarely higher.
For our Chapter 22 sample, the average Z" score was considerably worse, at 2.67 (3.05 median), with a BRE of CCC (Table VII ( 
D -Significance Test
In order to test the statistical significance of our average results of the two samples of
Chapter 11 emerging firms, we performed a "difference of means" test, indicated in Table VIII. The t-test between a mean of 4.73 (Chapter 11s) and 2.67 (Chapter 22s) was significantly different at the .01 level (t-test = 3.84) at the point nearest the emergence date and also one year later (t=3.60). So, it is clear that the sample of firms that eventually filed a second bankruptcy petition had a significantly worse financial profile just after emerging from bankruptcy than did the sample of firms which remained a going concern for at least five years after emerging.
-Why Do Firms Fail to Restructure Successfully
We have shown quite clearly that the overall risk profile of firms which are unsucessfully dimensions and that, in particular, measures of profitability and leverage were statistically significant different between the two groups. While we could argue that a reorganization plan could eventually lead to an improvement in profitability, there does not appear to be any excuse for the over-leveraged situation. Indeed, the equity/total liability ratio of Chapter 22 firms was only 0.27 vs. 0.74 for the Chapter 11 firms. To put it differently, the leverage of firms which failed again was almost three times greater than those that emerged and remained solvent. The
Chapter 22 sample had almost four times as much liabilities as equity ($3.70 of debt to every dollar of equity) while the Chapter 11 firms had about $1.35 of debt to every dollar of equity.
This finding confirms what Gilson (1997) first concluded based on earlier analysis of reasons for poorly constructed reorganization plans. The prescription for future successful reorganizations is clear --do not load up the balance sheet of emerging firms with excessive debt.
Table IX also shows that the average working capital to total assets of Chapter 22 firms was 0.09 vs. 0.15 for Chapter 11 firms. The retained earnings to total assets for Chapter 22s was a negative 0.22 vs. a negative 0.09 for 11's and the EBIT/TA for the Chapter 22's was a negative 0.07 vs. a positive 0.01 for 11's and, as noted above, the Chapter 11 firms had an equity/debt ratio of 0.74 vs. 0.27 for the Chapter 22s. The first two measures' differences were only marginally statistically significant. On the other hand, both the profitability and leverage measures were significantly different between the two samples (at the .01 level (extremely low p-values)).
-Implications and Conclusions
We have examined the financial profiles of firms emerging from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process as a publicly registered and owned company. Using the Z"-Score distress prediction model, we found that those firms that filed a subsequent bankruptcy petition had a significantly worse financial profile than did a sample of firms which emerged as a going concern and continued in that condition. Indeed, the average financial profile and bond rating equivalent for the Chapter 22 sample when it emerged from its first bankruptcy was not that much better than what a defaulted firm looks like. Firms which file for bankruptcy a second time emerged as significantly less profitable with significantly more leverage than those that emerge and remain as going concerns.
We believe that a credible corporate distress prediction model can be an important indicator of the future success of firms emerging from bankruptcy and could even be used as an independent technique by the bankruptcy court to assess the future viability of the reorganization plan, which, as the Bankruptcy Code stipulates, should be done. It could also be used by those responsible for devising and/or assessing the reorganization plan with the possible positive benefit of further modifications if the emerging firms' profiles are that of a continuing distressed company. Another potential benefit is for those creditors of the "old" company to assess the investment values of the new package of securities, including new equity, offered in the plan.
Or, for those investors considering purchasing the new equity, the technique can be another analytical tool. Finally, professional turnaround specialists, who might be involved in the cases, can use this early-warning technique to assess the likelihood that their efforts will succeed. 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Tables VII (a) and VII (b), Capital IQ.
Appendix A Chapter 33s
Chapter 33 is the unofficial name given to companies that have filed Chapter 11 reorganization for a third time. Below is a historical listing of companies that have filed Chapter 11 for the third time. 
